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Abstract
We embed the behaviour of tax evasion into the standard two-dimensional
Ising model. In the presence of an external magnetic field, the Ising model is
able to generate the empirically observed effect of tax morale, i.e. the phe-
nomenon that in some countries tax evasion is either rather high or low. The
external magnetic field captures the agents’ trust in governmental institu-
tions. We also find that tax authorities may curb tax evasion via appropriate
enforcement mechanisms. Our results are robust for the Baraba´si-Albert and
Voronoi-Delaunay networks.
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21 Introduction
Tax evasion can vary widely across nations, reaching extremely high values in some
developing countries. Wintrobe and Ge¨rxhani (2004) explain the observed higher
levels of tax evasion in generally less developed countries with a lesser amount of trust
that people accord to governmental institutions. Many empirical studies confirm
that tax payers are more willing to comply, the more they feel that the government
represents their preferences, i.e. the more content they are with how their govern-
ment uses tax revenue (see, e.g.: Schnellenbach, 2002; Torgler, 2004; Hyun, 2005;
Cummings et al., 2007). We consider the concept of tax morale important because
it seems for the most part to explain why compliance differs across countries even if
the level of enforcement is roughly the same. Our aim is to add to the experimen-
tal and empirical studies conducted on tax morale by applying a multi-agent-based
approach. In economics, the problem of tax evasion from a multi-agent-based per-
spective has received little attention to date (see Bloomquist (2006) for a recent
overview).
In two previous studies (Zaklan et al., 2008; Westerhoff et al., 2008) we modify
the two-dimensional Ising model to analyse how enforcement affects tax evasion
dynamics. The key idea in these papers is that agents may either behave honest
(tax payers) or dishonest (tax evaders), a decision which is subject to group influence.
We further augment the Ising model by adding an enforcement mechanism, which
consists of two elements: a probability of an audit (p) and a period of honesty (k)
in which detected evaders remain honest. We find evidence that enforcement has a
direct and indirect effect on aggregate tax evasion. First, enforcement obviously has
a direct effect on aggregate tax evasion since any tax evader who is audited becomes
honest for a certain period of time. Second, there is an important indirect effect of
enforcement on aggregate tax evasion since agents who live in an environment with
more honest agents are also likely to be honest, due to group influence. We also find
that even low levels of enforcement may help to prevent substantial fluctuations in
tax evasion.
The aim of the current work is to develop our previous studies by showing that
3our tax evasion model can also replicate the effect of tax morale, if an external
magnetic field is incorporated. By modifying the probabilities of evading or not
evading tax duties, the external magnetic field captures agents’ trust in governmental
institutions. By implementing a positive and a negative external magnetic field
and contrasting the resulting equilibrium levels of tax evasion with the baseline
setting, where the external magnetic field is absent, we show that our model can
explain both high and low levels of tax morale. To demonstrate that this remains
valid regardless of the level of enforcement, we depict the equilibrium values of tax
evasion corresponding to each considered external magnetic field for different levels
of enforcement.
The remainder of our manuscript is organised as follows: in section 2 we briefly
present our tax evasion model, which is based on the standard two-dimensional Ising
model on a square lattice. In section 3, we discuss how the external magnetic field
influences tax evasion. By varying the compliance level systematically and observing
the resulting equilibrium levels of tax evasion for different external magnetic fields,
we illustrate that the external magnetic field may be an appropriate tool which
enables different degrees of tax morale to be modeled, for any level of compliance.
In section 4, we also embed our model into the Baraba´si-Albert network and the
Voronoi-Delaunay random lattice. We find that the effect of the external magnetic
field also remains valid in these networks. The last section presents a number of
conclusions.
2 The model
We use the so-called single spin-flip heat-bath algorithm to simulate the Ising model
on a 1000 × 1000 square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. In this algo-
rithm, irrespective of the current state of the chosen spin, its new state is chosen
with probabilities P± = e
−βE±/(e−βE+ + e−βE−), where P± are the probabilities of
choosing the up (+) and down (−) states, respectively (Chowdhury and Stauffer,
2002), and β is defined as 1/(kB ·T ). The total energy (E) is given by the Hamilto-
nian H = −
∑
<i,j> JijSiSj−B
∑
i Si (we use Jij = J = 1). As an external magnetic
4field we use h = 2B/kBT . A negative external magnetic field acts to augment the
probability of becoming dishonest, whereas a positive field lowers this probability.
In our previous models we set B = 0, and hence neglect the influence of the external
magnetic field. We interpret a negative external magnetic field (h < 0) as agents’
low confidence in govenmental institutions, meaning that tax evasion is consequently
high. On the other hand, a positive external magnetic field (h > 0) implies above-
average confidence in the tax authorities: since individuals feel well represented by
the government, they feel more comfortable about paying their tax duty, and hence
evade paying tax less frequently.
We interpret this setup in the following way: in every time period each lattice
site is occupied by a tax payer who can either be honest (Si = +1) or a tax evader
(Si = −1). We assume that everybody is honest, initially. In consecutive time
periods agents have the opportunity to change their agent-type, enabling cheating
agents to become honest and honest citizens to become tax evaders. Each agent’s
social network is made up of four nearest neighbours, and they may either prefer
tax evasion, reject it or be indifferent.
Tax evaders have the greatest influence to turn honest citizens into tax evaders
if they constitute a majority in the given neighbourhood. If the majority evades
paying tax, one is likely to also evade. On the other hand, if most people in the
vicinity are honest, the respective individual is likely to become a decent citizen
if she was a tax evader before. The strength of neighbourhood influence can be
controlled by adjusting the temperature, T .
For very low temperatures, individuals mainly base their decision regarding tax
evasion on what the neighbourhood does. A rising temperature has the opposite
effect. Individuals then decide more autonomously. We only use temperatures below
Tc (≈ 2.269) for our simulations, since we are interested in modeling the effect of
group influence.
As an enforcement measure, we introduce a probability of an efficient audit (p).
If tax evasion is detected, the individual remains honest for a certain number of
periods. We denote the period of time for which detected tax evaders remain honest
by the variable k. We assume that k is a random number between either 0 and 10
5or 0 and 50 periods. Both of these intervals, which we will use, express that agents
are ashamed and feel guilty about their behaviour if cheating is detected, but that
the shame is of temporary nature, which is typical for the normal type of shame
(e.g. Potter-Efron and Efron (1993)). Obviously, the second interval allows detected
agents to be more ashamed on average, having evaded taxes: agents have a longer
memory of their wrongdoing.
One time unit is one sweep through the entire lattice. Audits are stochastically
independent from other agents and from the history any agent has.
3 Dynamics of the model
In Figure 1, the probability of an audit is set to 1% and the temperature to a level
25% below Tc. The upper left panel in Figure 1 (k ∈ [0, 10] and h = −0.25) illustrates
that tax evasion may spread throughout the population within only 1000 time steps,
given that the interval for the parameter k is chosen to be sufficiently small. The
level of tax evasion comes to rest at about 90 percent. The three panels below, also
in the first column of Figure 1, visualise the distribution of agent types after 50, 500
and 1000 time steps, respectively. It can be seen that both honest people (white)
and evaders (black) increasingly group together in clusters as time passes. After 50
time steps, when the aggregate tax evasion is at about 4 percent, the clusters are
still relatively small. After 500 time steps (about 35% of the population then evades
taxes), the clusters grow to such an extent, that individuals with different opinions
regarding tax evasion clearly separate. After 1000 time steps, tax evasion eventually
prevails, as the diagram at the bottom left clearly illustrates.
— Figure 1 goes about here —
The column on the right of Figure 1 shows that higher values of k (k ∈ [0, 50])
prevent this spread of tax evasion, keeping it at about 4% over time. The other three
diagrams in the right-hand column also illustrate the distribution of agent types after
50, 500 and 1000 time steps, respectively, and show that honest individuals remain
dominant over time.
6The left column of Figure 2 also implies a maximum duration of honesty of
10 periods, whereas the right column shows a maximum duration of honesty of 50
periods, after having been subject to an audit. We analyse for different strengths
of group influence (by systematically lowering the temperature further below Tc,
we accord more importance to group influence) how the equilibrium levels of tax
evasion evolve under different influences of the external magnetic field for different
enforcement levels: we implement these by gradually augmenting the probability of
an audit from 0 to 5% (in steps of 0.1 percent).
— Figure 2 goes about here —
Each equilibrium value in tax evasion is calculated by first allowing a transient phase
of 5000 time steps and by then forming the simple average of the tax evasion levels
over the next 1000 time steps. In Figure 2 the lines are marked identically to denote
the same influence of the external magnetic field: diamonds imply h = −0.5, squares
denote the absence of the external field (i.e. h = 0) and pluses represent the case
where the magnetic field is positive (h = 0.5).
Figure 2 illustrates that a positive external field (h = 0.5) works to lower tax
evasion, compared to the baseline case, where an external field is absent. On the
contrary, a negative external field works to augment the problem of tax evasion: the
curve where h = −0.5 (diamonds) is above and the curve where h = 0.5 (pluses) is
below the line where h = 0 (squares), for all considered probabilities of an audit.
Recall that a positive value of h stands for the case in which agents have great trust
in governmental institutions and that a negative value of h stands for the case in
which agents distrust governmental institutions. In this sense our model is able to
replicate the phenomenon of tax morale.
Note that, if the external magnetic field is negative, an increase in the audit rate
has the effect of reducing non-compliance substantially. Given that individuals are
sufficiently affected in the case of detection (right-hand column of Figure 2) and
group influence is sufficiently strong (panel on the bottom right), non-compliance
may be reduced from about 100% to below 10% by increasing the audit rate to 5%.
74 Modifications
We now consider our model on other network structures to obtain further support
for our results. In particular, we use the Voronoi-Delaunay random lattice and the
Baraba´si-Albert network model. The Voronoi-Delaunay lattice (i.e. tessellation of
the plane for a given set of points) is constructed as follows (Lima et al., 2000).
First, a given number of points are randomly distributed in a plane of a given size.
For each point, the polygonal cell, consisting of the region of space nearer to that
point than to any other point, must be determined. Whenever two such cells share
an edge, they are considered to be neighbours. Using the Voronoi tessellation, the
dual lattice can be obtained as follows: if two cells are neighbours, a link is placed
between the two points located in the cells. The triangulation of space is obtained
from the links. The network constructed in this way, which we use for simulation,
is called the Voronoi-Delaunay lattice.
The Baraba´si-Albert network (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999) is established such
that the probability of a new site being connected to one of the already existing
sites is proportional to the number of connections the existing site has already
accumulated over time: the chance for an agent to obtain a new connection is
greater if he is well connected already.
In these variations of our simple square lattice model, we also choose 1,000,000
agents and calculate the equilibrium levels of tax evasion. The results are displayed
in Figures 3 and 4. As can be seen in both networks, the Voronoi-Delaunay lattice
(Figure 3) and the Baraba´si-Albert network (Figure 4), higher values of k (i.e.
k ∈ [0, 50] versus k ∈ [0, 10]) also lead to lower equilibrium values in tax evasion
in any considered parameter setting, as in the square lattice network: identically
marked curves in panels on the right are lower than the corresponding curves, which
are in the same row, but on the left.
— Figures 3 and 4 go about here —
In the Voronoi-Delaunay network (Figure 3), the curves, where the external mag-
netic field is absent (h = 0) and where it is positive (h = 0.5) resemble much the
8corresponding lines in the square lattice network. Yet enforcement seems to work
better. Especially when looking at the case where the external magnetic field is
negative (h = −0.5), one can clearly see that non-compliance may be reduced from
very high to quite low levels. For example, if group influence is strong (T = 0.8 ·Tc)
and the agent’s memory typically high (k ∈ [0, 50]), the influence of the negative
external magnetic field, which favors non-compliance, may quickly be reduced by
augmenting the probability of an audit to such low levels as 0.5%.
Tax evasion is quite different under the Baraba´si-Albert network (Figure 4).
If a negative external field is applied (h = −0.5), tax evasion is lower for small
audit rates than in the square lattice or in the Voronoi-Delaunay network. While
tax evasion increases to nearly 100% in the other two networks if no audits are
conducted, in the Baraba´si-Albert network, on the other hand, non-compliance only
rises to about 70% (for p = 0). While tax evasion is lower for small audit rates
in the Baraba´si-Albert network, if a negative external field is applied, in the case
of no external field (h = 0) or a positive one (h = 0.5), equilibrium tax evasion
is much higher than in the other two networks. Also audit rates have a different
impact on tax evasion, compared to the other networks. While in the square lattice
and the Voronoi-Delaunay lattice tax evasion under a zero external and a positive
external magnetic field are only marginally reduced, in the Baraba´si-Albert network
tax evasion can be reduced substantially, by increasing the audit rate to 5% (here
we mean the amount of more compliance that can be established by implementing
higher levels of enforcement). If a negative external field is applied, it can be seen,
as in the other two networks, that tax evasion decreases with an increasing audit
rate and that for any level of enforcement (i.e. audit rate) non-compliance is higher
than for a zero or a positive external magnetic field.
For sufficiently small enforcement levels, we find for the applied negative external
magnetic field (h = −0.5) that the equilibrium values in tax evasion are higher, the
further the temperature is decreased.1 This is most obvious for the square lattice
1However, if the temperature is below a certain treshold (i.e. about T = 0.55 ·Tc for the square
lattice with k ∈ [0, 10]), the negative external magnetic field we apply is too small, to trigger
non-compliance to spread. For sufficiently low temperatures the state of compliance hence prevails
for the considered negative external magnetic field, even for low audit rates.
9with k ∈ [0, 10]: low enforcement levels (i.e small values of p) are less efficient to
reduce tax evasion, the more individuals focus on what their neighbours do (i.e. for
lower temperatures). In the presence of the negative external magnetic field, the
number of honest agents is small for low enforcement levels. At lower temperatures
honest agents (some agents become honest due to enforcement) have less influence
on cheating agents to become honest, so that, compared to higher temperatures, tax
evasion is higher for low enforcement levels. If enforcement levels increase, the tax
evasion of more people is detected and these agents then usually become compliant
for a while. If the number of agents is sufficiently large (due to a high level of
enforcement), their influence on the non-compliant individuals grows. The lower
the temperature is, the greater is their influence: non-compliance hence is smaller
at lower temperatures, if enforcement is sufficiently high. This can be observed also
in the Voronoi-Delaunay network for k ∈ [0, 10] and in the Baraba´si-Albert network
for lower values of kmax, e.g. kmax = 5.
Finally we briefly discuss why the non-compliance curve, which captures the
influence of the negative external magnetic field (h = −0.5), declines more rapidly in
the Baraba´si-Albert and in the Voronoi-Delaunay network, compared to the square
lattice, when the audit rate is increased. We conjecture that this can be explained
by the greater mean size of the neighbourhood in these two networks (on average,
the neighbourhood comprises 6 agents in the Baraba´si-Albert network and 8 agents
in the Voronoi-Delaunay lattice), compared to the square lattice (each agent has
only 4 nearest neighbours). Setting the audit rate to a positive value forces some
agents in the neighbourhood to become honest for k periods. The greater the size
of the neighbourhood is, the more honest agents will be included in the considered
agent’s social network. These honest agents then exert influence on the respective
individual to become honest, too. Hence, in the Voronoi-Delaunay lattice, which on
average includes most agents in a neighbourhood, increasing the audit rate slightly
has the effect of reducing non-compliance the most. In the Baraba´si-Albert network,
whose neighbourhood is intermediate in size, the same increase of the audit rate
consequently works less effectively to establish more compliance, compared to the
Voronoi-Delaunay lattice, although it is still better than in the square lattice.
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5 Conclusion
By incorporating the possibility of tax evasion into the Ising model we are able to
replicate, within the context of a multi-agent-based model, the empirical fact re-
garding the existance of tax morale by isolating the effect of the external magnetic
field on tax evasion. While in this study our focus is on the influence of the ex-
ternal magnetic field on tax evasion, other extensions to our simple model appear
interesting and economically important. Allowing agents to differ in their period of
honesty after detection seems to be just the first step in creating a more realistic tax
evasion model. Economic variables, which are important for the decision regarding
tax evasion, such as personal income, may need to be incorporated into the model.
Also, an intuitive extension to our hitherto very simple model may be to allow for
a third type of agent, who is neither entirely compliant nor entirely non-compliant,
but somewhere inbetween.
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Figure 1: Illustration of how a negative external magnetic field (here we use h =
−0.25) may cause most of society to become non-compliant. (A more detailed
decription is contained in section 3.)
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Figure 2: The panels on the left imply k ∈ [0, 10] and those on the right k ∈ [0, 50].
They illustrate the equilibrium levels of tax evasion for different probabilities of an
audit (the same applies to Figs. 3 and 4) in the square lattice network (cp. section
3).
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Figure 3: The same simulation setting as in Figure 2 applies to the Voronoi-Delaunay
lattice, which has a critical temperature of Tc = 3.802. (A more detailed decription
is given in section 4.)
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Figure 4: The same simulation setting as in Figure 2 applies to the Baraba´si-Albert
network, which has a critical temperature of Tc = m· log(NSITES)/2, where m = 4
and NSITES = 1, 000, 000. (A more detailed decription is contained in section 4.)
